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Causes and Consequences of the 
Spanish Economic Crisis: Why the 
Recovery is Taken so Long? 
 
Summary: Spain is currently facing its worst crisis in the last fifty years. The 
crisis began as an extension of the international financial crisis, but the internal
imbalances accumulated in the pre-crisis period aggravated the situation. At 
present their incomplete adjustment is making difficult the economic recovery. 
This paper describes the evolution of the economic crisis in Spain. The real
estate sector and the banking sector are analysed in detail, as they played a
key role in the detonation and the deepening of the crisis. The results of the
main reforms carried out so far are also carefully examined. It also discusses
the main factors that have delayed the economic recovery up to now (unem-
ployment and indebtedness), and present some alternatives to define an exit
strategy.
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After a long period of economic expansion, which began in the mid-nineties, in 2006 
the Spanish economy began to show the firsts signs of exhaustion. The international 
economic crisis, which began in 2007 and deepened in 2008, hastened the end of the 
expansive cycle and triggered a severe adjustment of the imbalances accumulated 
during the previous decade, whose correction continues to these days, four years 
later, pending its completion. 
The rapid deterioration of the international macroeconomic context high-
lighted the structural weaknesses of the Spanish economy, especially after 2008. Bet-
ting on a growth model heavily dependent on domestic demand, and more specifi-
cally on construction and property development activities, has proved to be an abso-
lute failure. The disproportionate growth in the real estate sector, coupled with the 
expansion of credit needed to finance it, is at the basis of the economic imbalances. 
In the real estate sector a spiral of growth in demand, prices and supply fuelled a ma-
jor bubble, which burst when the impact of the international crisis was felt in Spain. 
The massive credit granting to construction and property development activi-
ties caused an excessive exposure of the banking industry to those sectors. This ex-
posure was the means of transmission of the housing crisis to the banking sector, 
whose business is still very constrained by the inadequate risk policy and the deficits 
of supervision of the pre-crisis period. 
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The paper aims to: i) describe the evolution of the economic crisis in Spain; ii) 
highlight its differential aspects, and; iii) discuss the main factors that have delayed 
the economic recovery so far. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
one describes the impact of the crisis on the Spanish economy. Section two presents 
the evolution and current situation of the sectors that contributed to the deepening of 
the crisis: the real estate sector and the banking sector. Section three addresses the 
two main barriers to recovery: debt and unemployment. The reforms in the banking 
industry and the labour market are described and discussed in section four. Section 
five discusses some relevant issues and presents several policy recommendations. 
Section six concludes. 
 
1. The Crisis’s Impact 
 
The Spanish economy’s downward phase of the expansion cycle began in 2007. Four 
years later an economic recovery is yet to be seen. During 2007 and the first quarter 
of 2008, there was a growth slowdown, and from the second quarter of 2008 until the 
last quarter of 2009, the economy was in recession. This recession period of seven 
consecutive quarters was unusually long, since in a normal cycle, the recession does 
not usually extend beyond three or four quarters. The hardest stage of the crisis in 
terms of product breakdown and job destruction coincided with the first quarter of 
2009, when GDP fell 6.3% and unemployment increased by around 800,000 people. 
The Spanish economy began to recover in 2010, with a slight growth in output 
in every quarter except in the third. The output’s growth of that year, 0.6%, was very 
modest when compared with the accumulated loss of production in the previous two 
years (almost 5%). The 2011 data show the weakness of the recovery, with growth 
rates of 0.3% and 0.2% in the first and second quarters, respectively. 
As far as unemployment is concerned, the available data is very alarming. The 
unemployment rate rose from 8.3% (1,834,000 unemployed), in late 2007, to 20.1% 
(4,632,000 unemployed) in late 2010. The years of higher job destruction were 2008 
(growth of 41%) and especially 2009 (growth of 60.2%), in which the unemployment 
rate increased to 18.0% of the total workforce (4,150,000 unemployed). Unemploy-
ment increased mainly among younger workers (41% in the range of 16 to 25 years), 
particularly those with lower qualifications (between 25 and 45%, depending on edu-
cation levels) and among foreigners (30%). Throughout 2010 there was a strong 
growth in long-term unemployment, which represents 42.5% of the total, particularly 
among workers between the ages of 45 and 64 years old (52.5%). Unemployment 
growth is a differentiating aspect of the crisis in Spain. Between 2007 and 2010, the 
unemployment rate in Spain rose from 8.3% to 20.1% (11.8 percentage points), 
whereas in the euro zone the increase was less accentuated merely from 7.5% to 
10.1% (2.6 percentage points). 
In addition to the high unemployment rates, there are other differentiating as-
pects when compared to the eurozone. Although the product’s fall is similar in terms 
of magnitude, its composition presents significant differences. Between 2008 and 
2010, domestic demand in Spain fell 7.6%, whereas in the eurozone it fell merely 
1.6%. Investment in housing was the most affected component, which in these three 
years decreased by 41%. Households reduced their savings rate to historically low  
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levels and increased their fixed capital investment to maximum levels. In 2007, this 
behaviour decisively contributed to the increase of the households’ debt up to 130% 
of their gross disposable income (GDI). Currently, the ratio of debt lies close to 
125%, higher than the eurozone average (98%), similar to the United States (118%) 
and lower than the United Kingdom (151%). The slow pace of households’ delever-
aging is mainly due to the weakness of household income and the long term debt 
amortization for house purchase, which hinder the rapid liabilities depletion. 
Non-financial firms’ debt, in terms of gross operating surplus, is around 
750%, surpassing those of the eurozone (~ 550%), the UK (~ 650%) and the U.S. (~ 
350%). Since the peaks reached in 2008, the ratio of firm debt has only been reduced 
by 1% due to the scant growth of firms’ results. It should be noted, however, that in 
terms of debt, there are considerable differences at the sectoral level. For instance in 
the construction and property development sectors, the level of debt greatly exceeds 
that of other sectors of the economy, in spite of the fact that over the past two years, 
the deleveraging process of non-financial firms has been mainly focused on these 
sectors. The high amount of debt in these sectors reflects the enormous stock of un-
sold real estate assets. 
In 2009, the high growth of public investment (11.2%) served to offset the im-
pact of the strong adjustment of private investment. However, in 2010, the need to 
control the growth of public deficit led public investment to contract by more than 
17%. The Spanish economy went from having a surplus in public accounts of 1.9% 
in 2007, to presenting a deficit of 9.2% in 2010, having peaked at 11.1% in 2009. 
Public debt increased from 36.1% in 2007 to 60.1% in 2010. 
In 2010 a process of fiscal consolidation was initiated. The Updated Stability 
Programme of February 2010 established a procedure for gradually reducing the 
deficit to 3% of the GDP by 2013. In 2010, fiscal consolidation was achieved thanks 
to a one percentage point increase in the ratio of tax revenues on GDP and a fall of 
eight tenths in the ratio of public expenditure on GDP. Table 1 presents the main 
budget adjustments approved by the Spanish government since September 2009. In 
2010, revenues increased primarily due to the increased VAT collection, which offset 
the less dynamic collection of direct taxation. The cut in spending has focused mostly 
on capital expenses and intermediate consumption. Social benefits increased due to 
the inertial evolution of pension expenditure and the high incidence of unemploy-
ment benefits. Interests on debt followed an upward trend and already account for 
1.9% of GDP. In the coming years due to the likely evolution of public debt and in-
terest rates, it is expected that the interest burden of public debt will increase its 
weight in public expenditure. 
In April 2011, the government submitted a new version of the Stability Pro-
gramme, for the 2011-2014 period. According to the set out objectives, public deficit 
will be reduced to 3% of the GDP by the end of 2013 and the public debt ratio will 
stabilize just below 70% of the GDP, in the 2012-2013 biennium. 65% of the adjust-
ment in the 2009-2013 period is based on spending cuts, including a deep reduction 
of public consumption (35% of total). 
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Table 1   Main Fiscal Consolidation Measures in Spain 
 
Set-2009  Increase of VAT’s general rate to 18%;
Elimination of the deduction of €400 on Personal Income Tax; 
Reduction of ministries expenditure (€8,000 million). 
Jan-2010  Setting of limits to hiring in the civil service (one entry per ten exits);
Reduction of ministries expenditure (€5,000 million). 
May-2010  Suppression of monetary incentives to childbirth (elimination of the baby-check);
5% reduction in public sector’s wages; 
Pensions’ freezing; 
Cuts on medicines and public works expenditure. 
Set-2010  Increase of Personal Income Tax for high income groups;
Reduction of ministries expenditure (€13,200 million). 
Dec-2010  Increase of taxes on tobacco;
Privatization of public enterprises – National Lotteries (Loterías del Estado) and Airports (AENA). 
Aug-2011  Anticipation of payments on account of the Firm’s Income Tax;
Additional cuts on medicines spending. 
 
Source: Author’s reviews. 
 
In light of current macroeconomic situation there is great uncertainty regard-
ing compliance with the objectives of last April’s Stability Programme. Firstly, be-
cause they are based on a macroeconomic scenario, that assumes a relatively high 
rate of economic growth. Secondly, because a significant proportion of Spain’s pub-
lic expenditure has, traditionally, an incremental inertia, namely expenditures in 
health, education and pensions. Thirdly, due to the significant expense of unemploy-
ment benefits (equivalent to 3% of the GDP in 2010), caused by the persistence of 
high unemployment levels (over 20%), whose reduction is not foreseeable in the near 
future. 
Regarding prices’ evolution, the sharp drop in consumption and in fixed capi-
tal investment has allowed to partially correct the huge imbalances accumulated in 
the pre-crisis expansion period, in terms of inflation differential with the eurozone. 
As far as wages are concerned, in the early years of the crisis, remuneration per em-
ployee continued to increase as a result of the inertia of collective bargaining and the 
sharp increase in non-wage costs, such as compensations for dismissal. In 2010, re-
muneration per employee grew only by 1.4% (2.3 percentage points less than in 
2009), in part due to the Agreement for Employment and Collective Bargaining 
(AENC), signed by the social agents in February 2010. The expected wage modera-
tion indicates the beginning of the process to correct the Spanish Economy’s real 
exchange rate. 
As previously mentioned, the construction and property development sectors 
in Spain had an essential role in the detonation and extension of the current economic 
crisis. The disproportionate growth of housing prices has led to a housing bubble of 
enormous proportions. There are three factors that have contributed to its emergence 
and development. First, the monetary policy followed by the European Central Bank, 
since 2001, which kept the reference interest rate at very low levels for the cyclical 
position of the Spanish economy. Secondly, the fiscal policy followed by the Spanish 
government, which promoted the acquisition of housing instead of other alternatives, 
such as renting, and encouraged the purchase of real estate assets (including housing) 
in detriment of other investment assets. Thirdly, the advantages of a model of eco- 
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nomic growth based on construction and property development activities, from the 
political economy point of view i) reduction of unemployment, given that these are 
labour-intensive activities (favouring politicians), ii) increase in housing value (fa-
vouring the median voter, who is usually a home owner), and iii) generation of large 
tax revenues (particularly real estate) for the different public administrations (favour-
ing politicians) (Celia Bilbao Terol, María A. García Valiñas, and Javier Suárez 
Pendiello 2006). Therefore, in this context, it can be stated that for many years, there 
was no political interest in halting the excessive growth of construction activities and 
property development. 
The initial price increases derived from favourable market conditions for 
mortgages, followed by additional increases resulting from the contagion of positive 
expectations about price evolution, resulting in a bubble of enormous proportions. 
The bursting of the bubble led to a severe fall in demand, which in turn resulted in an 
adjustment in supply, either via prices or via quantities. 
Credit for construction and property development activities was the mean of 
transmitting the housing crisis to the banking sector. In the pre-crisis expansion pe-
riod, 2004-2007, credit to the construction sector experienced an average annual 
growth of 24.6%, whereas credit to the real estate sector grew at an average annual 
rate of 43.1%. In 2007 loans to both sectors accounted for almost 45% of the Spanish 
GDP (14.5% to construction and 30% to property development), when their overall 
weight in product was less than 20%. 
This unbalanced growth of credit has resulted in a high concentration of risks 
in the construction and property development sectors, both on the supply and on the 
demand side, resulting from the inadequate risk policy of the banking system and the 
Bank of Spain’s insufficient supervision during this period. The huge stock of real 
estate assets, whose construction or purchase was financed with bank loans, re-
mained in the financial entities balance sheets and, in a recession period with a de-
mand deficit like the current one, produces losses by default and assets depreciation 
and adversely affects banks’ turnovers. This situation is at the basis of the solvency 
problems of an important part of the banking system, namely the Savings Banks – 
Cajas de Ahorros, whose weight in the sector, measured by various indicators, is 
close to 50%. To tackle the solvency problems, throughout 2010 an intense restruc-
turing process took place in the banking sector in Spain, which up to now is produc-
ing positive results in terms of reorganization, losses recognition and recapitalization. 
Currently, the program of fiscal consolidation, the elevated rates of unem-
ployment and the high indebtedness levels explain the low dynamism of internal de-
mand. The recovery of economic growth is also aggravated by the sovereign debt 
crisis. Spain, Italy and the three rescued countries (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal)
1 
are facing financing problems as a result of the eurozone institutional design’s prob-
lems (Paul De Grauwe 2011a). In these circumstances, be a member of the eurozone 
can contribute to the deepening of its own crisis (Paul Krugman 2011). This is par-
ticularly evident in the Spanish case, as their fiscal problems do not stem from irre-
                                                        
1 For excellent reviews on the crisis in these countries see Georgios P. Kouretas and Prodromos Vlamis 
(2010), Constantin Gurdgiev et al. (2011), and João Sousa Andrade and Adelaide Duarte (2011), respec-
tively.  
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sponsibility of its government. Arise from the asymmetric shocks that occur within 
the eurozone (Krugman 2010). 
 
2. The Two Key Sectors 
 
2.1 Evolution and Current Situation of the Real Estate Sector 
 
Between 1997 and 2007, there was a long cycle of housing expansion in Spain. This 
cycle is different from others due to the extraordinary construction volume and its 
exceptional duration (eleven years). During this period, the average annual growth in 
the construction sector was higher than 5%. In late 2007, the construction sector con-
centrated almost 14% of employment and 16% of the Spanish GDP. By including 
demand related sectors, output and employment dependent on the construction sector 
achieved respectively, in that same year, 25% of the GDP and 23% of the overall 
employment (Ramón Tamames 2009). 
The demand for housing has been stimulated by several factors. The main 
ones are the strong economic expansion seen in this period (in part due to the real 
estate’s boom) and the reduced interest rate on housing loans after the Euro integra-
tion (the reference rate for loans of this type decreased from 9.6% in 1997 to 3.3% in 
2007). Other factors explaining the strong dynamics of demand are the greater com-
petition in the banking sector, the growth in the number of households, largely due to 
the massive influx of immigrants (about 4.5 million in the 1997-2007 period), and 
the housing purchase by non-residents, as second homes. 
The strong demand for housing found a very dynamic response on the supply 
side. In the 1997-2007 period almost 5.3 million dwellings were finished in Spain 
and, in several years of the expansion cycle, the number of finished dwellings per 
year surpassed half a million. The net increase in the housing stock between 2001 
and 2008 was of 4.3 million homes. The stock rose from 20.8 million in 2001 to 25.1 
million in 2008, representing an increase of almost 21%. The extraordinary growth in 
demand has resulted in an increase in housing investment (from 4.7% of GDP in 
1997 to 9.7% in 2007). 
The massive housing acquisition stimulated by these demand factors has 
spurred an extraordinary demand for credit. Between 1997 and 2007, housing loans 
as a percentage of GDP increased from 28.4% to 102.9%. The widespread use of 
credit for housing exceptionally increased households’ private debt. This debt rose 
from 52.7% of disposable income in 1997 to a maximum of 132.1% in 2007. As a 
result, the effort of individuals to acquire a dwelling rose from 4.3 years of salary at 
the beginning of the cycle to 9.1 years at the end of it. 
In the demand’s growth initial phase, the inability to adjust supply automati-
cally, due to the specific characteristics of the good’s production process, led to the 
emergence of tensions in prices (Prakash Loungani 2008). The increases in real es-
tate prices became more intense when expectations of the price’s future growth af-
fected their own demand, inducing a spiral of growth in demand, supply and prices. 
This situation led the average price growth to come close to 20%, in several years. 
According to the Bank of Spain (the Spanish Central Bank), between 1997 and 
2007, the average housing price in Spain rose by 115% in real terms, while in Ireland  
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the revaluations were of 160%, in the UK of 140%, in the United States of 80% and 
in the eurozone merely 40% (Banco de España 2011a). In Spain, the economic fun-
damentals of price growth are not the only factors explaining the high inflation in the 
sector. The observed increase is also explained by the demand’s significant over-
reaction. The extraordinary revaluation of property assets until 2007, followed by a 
sharp decrease, reveals that there was a great bubble in the Spanish real estate sector, 
which caused strong overvaluation of residential real estate. 
From late 2007, prices began to slightly fall and sales experienced a very 
strong decrease. In other words, in the months following the bubble’s burst, adjust-
ments were made through quantities rather than prices. Later on, a price adjustment 
was made in order to approach market prices to the real economic value of the assets. 
In the Spanish case, the reduction in prices from peak levels was very gradual; albeit 
in cumulative terms it is already beginning to reflect a significant adjustment. Ac-
cording to the Ministry of Public Works, the fall in prices between the maximum of 
2007 and the first quarter of 2011 was 15% in nominal terms and 20% in real terms 
(Banco de España 2011a). Tinsa (the main real estate valuation company in Spain) 
estimates that the adjustment in prices was even greater. In nominal terms, the cumu-
lative fall in prices, between the maximum at the end of 2007 and July of 2011 was 
slightly above 22% (Tinsa 2011). This decrease in prices is justified by the decline in 
employment, the increase in the cost of capital, the growth in the housing stock and 
the presence of significant levels of credit rationing. Despite the continuous declines 
in prices, the decrease in housing sales in cumulative terms between 2007 and 2010 
was higher than 43% (Banco de España 2010). 
The supply’s adjustment has also been very important. In 2006, the number of 
dwellings started surpassed 850,000. Two years later only one-third were actually 
begun. In 2010, the number of works started included only 90,000 dwellings, 20,000 
less than in the previous year (Julio Rodríguez 2011). According to the evolution of 
the number of dwellings completed in the 2008-2010 period, the housing stock in late 
2010 could have reached 25.7 million homes. In that year, the estimates on the stock 
of completed unsold homes ranged between 670,000 and 1,100,000 (Rodríguez 
2011). In the real estate’s expansive cycle an average of nearly 500,000 dwellings a 
year were built, when according to the demographic structure of the country, the an-
nual potential of homes’ creation is of approximately 350,000 per year (David 
Martínez, Tomás Riestra, and Ignacio San Martín 2006); however, that potential, in 
the Spanish case, depends largely on the effective evolution of employment. 
The sectoral adjustment will be long and slow. According to the transaction 
volumes over the last two years, the absorption of the stock of new unsold housing 
can last four to five years. In 2010, the volume of transactions grew approximately 
6%, countering the drops of previous years. However, the total number of transac-
tions amounts to little more than half of those held in the most dynamic exercise 
(2006). This growth in transactions is primarily justified by the anticipation of pur-
chases to save taxes, the fall in asset prices and the low interest rates (there was, nev-
ertheless, a tightening of the credit criteria). 
Last August, the government announced a temporary VAT reduction for new 
housing purchases by four percentage points (from 8% to 4%) until the end of the  
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year, in order to stimulate housing demand and accelerate the reduction of the accu-
mulated stock. It is unlikely that this conjectural measure will boost the Spanish 
housing market. Its main impact will be the anticipation of housing acquisition by a 
limited number of households to take advantage of this VAT reduction. 
 
2.2 Evolution and Current Situation of the Banking Sector 
 
From 2007 onwards, the evolution of the Spanish banking sector is highly condi-
tioned by the extent of the international crisis and the bursting of the housing bubble 
in Spain. The generalization of the international crisis and the lack of confidence in 
the financial markets, have restricted Spanish banks’ access to financing in the inter-
national markets. In recent years, the internal factors that have mostly affected the 
sector’s profits are the banks’ high exposure to real estate, together with the eco-
nomic downturn and the consequent unemployment increase. Note that these factors 
decisively contributed to the rising of the default rate, with consequences on the sol-
vency levels of the sector. 
At the end of 2010, the Spanish banking sector was among the firsts in the 
ranking of the eurozone in terms of return on assets (0.47%) and return on own re-
sources (7.9%) (Banco de España 2011b). On the contrary, in terms of solvency, its 
position is not as favourable. The overall solvency of the Spanish banking sector is 
among the worst of the eurozone, 11.9%, almost two percentage points below the 
average. The use of other indicators of solvency, for example, Tier 1, also shows the 
weakness of the Spanish banking sector (9.6%, well below the eurozone average). 
This overview of the banking sector conceals the existence of significant 
asymmetries between the two main types of entities, particularly in terms of sol-
vency. In the Spanish banking sector two major classes of entities coexist: traditional 
banks and Savings Banks – Cajas de Ahorros. The latter assume a central role in the 
Spanish banking system, since they concentrate more than 48% of deposits and more 
than 46% of the loans of the banking sector (Confederación Española de Cajas de 
Ahorros 2011). During the long expansion period before the crisis, a significant part 
of the Savings Bank sub-sector accumulated financial imbalances of various kinds, 
which became evident after the change of the macroeconomic conditions. 
One of the most troubling aspects of the balance sheets of these entities is the 
high risk concentration in construction activities and property development, both on 
the supply and the demand side. In late 2009, before the beginning of the restructur-
ing process of the banking sector, credit to the construction and property develop-
ment sectors granted by the Savings Banks accounted for 56.3% of the total financ-
ing for productive activities and 27.7% of its loan portfolio to the resident private 
sector. In that date, credit for the acquisition and rehabilitation of housing repre-
sented 41% of the total number of loans granted. Other problematic aspects of this 
sub-sector are the excessive dependence on wholesale financial markets, the excess 
of capacity installed by the intense growth of their retail distribution networks, the 
significant sectoral fragmentation and the loss of profitability derived from the struc-
tures’ oversize, the increase in unprofitable assets and the rising financing cost. 
In late 2010, due to the potential problems that exposure to the construction 
and property development sectors could generate to the entire banking sector, the  
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Bank of Spain promoted an informative transparency exercise. The goal was for 
banks to publish, in early 2011 and according to predefined standards, additional in-
formation about their exposure to these sectors, identifying the percentage of bad 
loans, guarantees at their disposal and the provisions made to cope with possible as-
sets’ deterioration. The results of this exercise revealed a significant degree of het-
erogeneity in the sector, in terms of levels of solvency, rates of bad loans, degree of 
exposure to the construction and property development sectors, magnitude of the 
assets awarded and the degree of coverage with provisions, among others. 
In late 2010, the credit concentration in the construction sector, real estate ac-
tivities and house purchases reached nearly 60% of the credit to the resident private 
sector. Credit to construction and property development accounted for around 20% of 
the loan portfolio to the resident private sector (22% of the Savings banks’ loan port-
folio and 17% from the Banks’), while housing loans accounted for approximately 
39% of it. As mentioned before, this high concentration of risks is extremely worry-
ing, due to the continuous growth of default rates and the high value of real estate 
assets that passed into the hands of banks, as a consequence of high failure rates. In 
late 2010, the default rate for credits granted to real estate developers reached 14%, 
while those granted to construction companies neared 11%. Contrarily, the default 
rate for housing loans was significantly lower, falling below 2.5%. 
In late 2010, Savings Banks continued to report higher levels of exposure to 
construction and property development. Specifically, their total exposure was of 
€217 billion, of which €173 billion (80%) were related to investment credit and the 
remaining €44 billion (20%) to awarded properties. At that time, the potentially prob-
lematic investment which included bad debts, substandard loans and awarded proper-
ties amounted to €100 billion (46% of the total). The specific provisions made repre-
sent 31% of these exposures (38% if general provisions are accounted for). 
Regardless of the various challenges that the banking sector is currently fac-
ing, the most worrying from an economic point of view as a whole is its inability to 
fulfil its basic function of financing economic growth. With the intensification of the 
crisis there was a sharp contraction of the annual credit growth rate, which became 
negative due to the prolonged crisis. The type of credit that experienced a greater 
contraction during the crisis was the credit to companies. Credit to households has 
also declined, albeit to a lesser extent. With regard to bank credit to companies, it 
presents a clear pro-cyclical behaviour. In early 2008, credit to companies in Spain 
grew at annual rates exceeding 30% (twice the eurozone average). In late 2009, the 
growth of credit to companies became negative, reaching its maximum in the first 
half of 2010 (-4.2%). Since that time, it has remained virtually stagnant. The con-
struction industry was the sector most affected by the crisis, showing a downward 
trend since late 2008, which reached the two digits by mid-2009. In the case of 
households’ credit the rates falling has been less pronounced and, since early 2009 
they have remained close to zero. 
Tensions experienced during the last year and a half in the eurozone’s finan-
cial markets, resulting from the sovereign debt crisis, brought about an increase in 
the state’s and the banks’ financing costs, and has made access to markets more dif-
ficult for the latter. Risk premiums from resident issuers have been increasing. Last  
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August, they went slightly beyond the 400 basic points. The risk premiums remain 
high and subject to the fluctuating market perception on the situation of public fi-
nances and the macroeconomic framework of various countries, as well as the sol-
vency of their financial systems in a context of high volatility. 
In this context, banks’ activity is subject to pressures of a different nature. Firstly, 
because the sovereign debt crisis has resulted in a significant increase in financing 
costs for these entities, and secondly, because they continue to bear the losses arising 
from the deterioration of real estate assets, due to the excessive exposure of its risks’ 
portfolio to a sector where the process of price adjustment has not yet been com-
pleted. 
 
3. The Two Big Problems 
 
3.1 The Huge Debt Growth 
 
In the medium term, the most important problem of the Spanish economy is not the 
public debt’s size, as in other European economies. The main source of problems is 
the high private debt, resulting from a historically high amount of liabilities of busi-
nesses and households. In Spain, since 2004, the increase in the private sector’s debt 
was five times higher than in the eurozone. Credit growth rates to the private sector 
followed an upward trend until 2006, when the annual growth rate approached 30%, 
remaining at levels higher than the nominal growth in GDP until the end of 2008. 
The Spanish public debt was at the end of 2010 equivalent to 60.1% of the 
GDP, 25 percentage points lower than the eurozone’s average (85.1%), on the other 
hand private debt represented around 224% of the product. Households’ debt 
amounts to €902 billion (~ 85% of the GDP), while firms’ debt reaches €1.477 bil-
lion (~ 139% of the GDP). Since 2004, the debt’s total increased by over 71% since 
in that year it was only of €1,800 billion compared to the €3,085 billion in late 2010. 
The private sector’s indebtedness has been mainly growing during the pre-
crisis period. In the 2004-2007 period, the credit’s average annual growth in Spain 
was of 21.8%, while in the eurozone it was only of 8.9%. This particular credit evo-
lution can be explained by the strong growth in housing loans to households and es-
pecially by the excessive credit growth for productive activities, in particular, for 
construction and real estate activities. The remaining productive sectors registered 
credit increases in line with the eurozone. 
The economic recession caused a significant drop in households and firms’ in-
comes that refrain private debt growth. Simultaneously, economy’s private sectors 
began a process of debt reduction, albeit at an extremely reduced pace. Since its peak 
in 2008, the debt ratio of non-financial firms fell by only 1%, while the decrease in 
the ratio of households was even more modest. 
The pressure that markets exert on the Spanish economy, since the beginning 
of 2010, results in part from the fact that a very significant proportion of public and 
private debt is computed as external debt. In late 2010, for example, in the case of 
public debt, foreign investors owned almost half (47%) of the Spanish sovereign 
debt. This is a differential aspect of the Spanish economy over other highly indebted 
economies such as Italy, Belgium or Japan, since in these cases the debt is mostly 
financed by domestic savings.  
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In late 2010, the Spanish economy’s external debt was of €1,740 billion, 
equivalent to 164% of the GDP. In March of that year it had reached its historical 
peak at €1,790 billion, representing 167% of the GDP. The distinctive feature of the 
Spanish external debt is not its relative size; the most worrying aspect of its recent 
evolution is its rapid growth, since between 2002 and 2010 it nearly tripled, rising 
from €600 billion to €1,740 billion today. During this period, two thirds of the funds 
used to finance the Spanish economy’s growth came from abroad. 
The deleveraging of the private sector should intensify in the coming years. 
The best way to further this process is through recovering income, and that is why all 
policies aimed at improving the capacity to generate economic growth are the best 
contribution to complete it successfully. Otherwise, debt will continue to be a burden 
on spending, especially in an environment where interest rates may rise again in re-
sponse to inflationary pressures in the core countries of the eurozone. 
The structural deleveraging of the private sector is extremely important for the 
banking sector, since it reduces their financing needs. According to the Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch, each basic point reduction in leverage implies a decrease of 
€15 billion in the financing needs of Spanish banking (Centro del Sector Financiero 
PwC and IE Business School 2011). Thus, a credits’ reduction and a zero growth in 
deposits would reduce the financing needs of Spanish banking by €37 billion. 
 
3.2 Unemployment’s Uncontrolled Growth 
 
The crisis’ impact on employment in the Spanish economy was devastating. Since 
the crisis began until the end of 2010, the number of people unemployed increased 
by 152%, up to 4,632,000 workers (20.1% of the workforce), of which 4 out of 10 
are long-term unemployed persons, 1 out of 4 have a temporary contract, 1 out of 3 
are less than 29 years old and 6 out of 10 are low-skilled. The current number of un-
employed people is higher than in early 1994 (just over 3.5 million), when the unem-
ployment rate peaked in the time series (24% of the workforce). These data reveal 
that there are institutional aspects in the Spanish labour market that give rise to struc-
tural unemployment, that unemployment particularly affects well-defined groups and 
that the problem of high unemployment is not a new phenomenon, probably because 
some of its main causes have been persisting for decades. 
The current high unemployment rate has its origin in factors of a different na-
ture. The first factor is the impact of the housing crisis on employment levels. In the 
years of greater intensity, between 2008 and 2010, job losses in the Spanish construc-
tion sector (including real estate) were higher than 36% (Carlos Alvarez Aledo 
2011). Job losses in construction were higher only in the Baltic countries and Ireland 
(around 50%), whereas in other countries affected by housing crisis, such as the 
United States and Denmark, were considerably lower (around 25%). The reduction in 
the employment’s percentage is amplified in the Spanish case by the relatively high 
weight that employment in the construction sector had in the employment’s total at 
the beginning of the crisis (13.2% versus 8.4% in the eurozone). To this loss we must 
add those of the construction activities’ industrial and service suppliers. 
Another factor that justifies the high unemployment growth since the begin-
ning of the crisis is the sharp appreciation of the real exchange rate observed from  
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the launch of the monetary union. Over the past decade, labour costs per unit pro-
duced increased 20% more in Spain than in the eurozone, which reduced the Spanish 
economy’s competitiveness (Ángel Laborda 2010).
 During the pre-crisis period this 
wage inflation had no effect on economic growth (through the loss of competitive-
ness), since it was primarily based on the expansion of non-tradable sectors and on 
the strong growth of domestic demand. With the triggering of this crisis firms have 
been forced to reduce costs in order to maintain their market share and profitability 
levels. Due to the inability to devalue the currency and the rigidity of nominal wages 
regarding the fall, the only way to make the necessary adjustment is to increase pro-
ductivity, which in the short run is only possible through the workers’ dismissal. 
A third factor that explains the enormous unemployment growth in Spain is 
related to the structural characteristics of its labour market. This is characterized by a 
strong rigidity of wages and hours worked and by an intense workers’ segmentation. 
This segmentation results in a dual labour market where workers with high wages 
and protected by high severance pays coexist with low wage earners with little pro-
tection. The adjustments are mainly produced at the cost of the latter due to their 
lower level of productivity. Therefore unemployment rates within this group are sig-
nificantly higher than the average. 
Maintaining high levels of wage rigidity and labour market conditions implies 
that the only way to reduce relative costs is by improving productivity by adjusting 
or reducing firms’ workforce. Therefore, it is expected that economic growth in the 
coming years will be less labour intensive than in the pre-crisis period, both by job 
losses in construction and by the adjustment of the real exchange rate. Economic 
forecasts for the coming years predict a steady decline in unemployment levels with 
consequences for economic growth. On the one hand, via demand, because it affects 
the demand for household consumption, and, on the other hand, via supply, because 
it will reduce the economy’s potential growth. 
 
4. The Two Main Reforms 
 
4.1 The Banking Sector’s Reform 
 
Regardless of the crisis’ impact on the banking sector and its consequences on the 
real economy, for several years in Spain there was a broad consensus on the need for 
a thorough reform of the banking sector in general and of the Savings Banks sector in 
particular. The beginning of the crisis showed that it was necessary to move quickly 
with a deep reform process, mainly for structural reasons and for the intrinsic charac-
teristics of the Spanish economy’s growth model in the pre-crisis period: the high 
importance of the construction and real estate sectors and its great dependence on 
external funding. However, the reform process did not materialize until 2010, two 
years later than in most European countries and the United States. 
However, already in 2009, a new institution with a key role in the process of 
bank restructuring was created, the so called Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring 
(FROB), whose principal aim is to strengthen the solvency of banks by providing 
funding to facilitate the processes of restructuring. The FROB was created in order to 
find solutions for entities with specific difficulties, thus minimizing the use of public 
resources.  
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In 2010 a series of measures were implemented in order to increase financial 
transparency so as to improve investor confidence in the Spanish banking: the stress 
tests and the exercise of informative transparency (to make public the extent of each 
bank’ exposure to the real estate sector). Also in 2010 regulation on provisions was 
tightened and the reform of the Savings Banks Law was approved. This reform aims 
at healing the main weaknesses of the sector, namely governance and funding issues. 
On the one hand, managers’ professionalism requirements are strengthened. On the 
other, these entities are allowed to raise high quality equity, permitting, among other 
possibilities, to exercise their financial activity through a commercial bank with the 
ability to issue shares in the markets. 
At the beginning of 2011, due to the increased tensions in the debt markets, 
the Bank of Spain (through the RDL 2/2011) raised the minimum requirements of 
core capital to 8% or 10% of risk-weighted assets, depending on the specific charac-
teristics of the banks. This measure also allows the FROB to serve as a recapitaliza-
tion tool to those banks that are unable to reach the minimum levels by themselves. 
A key aspect of the bank restructuring model developed in Spain is its orderli-
ness, which contrasts with the bailouts, capital injections and other piecemeal meas-
ures previously implemented in other European banking systems. The reform of the 
Spanish banking system, that integrates the measures described above, has three 
main objectives: reorganization, recognition of losses and capitalization. 
The restructuring, integration and capacity reduction processes fall within the 
scope of reorganization. The concentration processes that were started by the end of 
2010 affected 40 of the 45 Savings Banks with operations in the market earlier that 
year, whose assets represented 94% of the sub-sector (€1,212 billion). There were 
twelve concentration processes, through conventional mergers or Institutional Protec-
tion Systems (SIP) or through the acquisition of previously intervened entities (at the 
end of 2010, they have been intervened Caja Castilla-La Mancha and Caja Sur).
2 In 
nine of the twelve concentration processes FROB resources were requested by a total 
amount of €11,559 million. The remaining three processes did not request public 
funding. 
At the end of 2010, after the aforementioned concentration processes the Sav-
ings Banks sub-sector had only 17 entities. The size of the entities has more than 
doubled (the average of the assets total by bank grew from €29,000 million to 
€76,000 million) and the number of small and medium sized savings banks was dra-
matically reduced (from 36 to 6 – with less than €35,000 million in assets). Addition-
ally, the sector’s concentration has allowed a significant reduction in capacity. The 
adjustments provided under these processes represent staff reductions between 12% 
and 18% and networks’ size reductions between 10% and 25%. 
Under the second objective, the Spanish banking industry has recognized and 
assumed losses in asset value by an amount equivalent to 9% of the GDP. Since 
2008, the banking system made a significant effort in sanitation (€91,000 million), 
                                                        
2 In late July 2011, Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo (CAM), the fourth biggest Spanish Savings Bank 
(with €78,000 million in assets and more than 950 branches) was also intervened. The FROB national-
ized the CAM, with an injection of €2,800 million, and intends to auction its banking business in Sep-
tember this year.  
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through the establishment of specific and general provisions (€69,000 million) and 
the recognition of significant losses in the assets’ value within integration processes 
(€22,000 million) (Santiago Carbó Valverde and Joaquim Maudos 2011). This effort 
focused primarily on the Savings Banks’ sub-sector, since in that period, they recog-
nized asset losses of an amount close to €52,000 million (Banco de España 2011d). 
Finally under the goal of recapitalization of banking entities, they increased 
their capital mostly through reserves by an amount equivalent to 3.7% of the GDP. 
The recapitalization involved an effort to improve the Tier 1 ratio, which rose from 
7.6% in late 2007 to 9.5% in late 2010. 
 
4.2 The Labour Market Reform 
 
The institutional structure of the Spanish labour market generates great inter-
generational injustice, since older workers with higher skills enjoy an extraordinary 
level of protection and considerable wage increases at the expense of younger ones. 
It is therefore a dual labour market, where important issues such as the protection of 
workers, the introduction of flexibility and the updating of wages should be redefined 
because: i) the level of protection for permanent contracts and the precariousness of 
temporary contracts are among the highest in the world; ii) the introduction of flexi-
bility in the labour market is usually done through temporary contracts with very low 
levels of protection, which has negative consequences in terms of productivity, and; 
iii) the regime of wage bargaining generates a bias that promotes wage increases, 
undermining job creation. 
In order to solve some of the labour market’s structural problems, in 2010 the 
government undertook a reform of this market, which came into force later that year. 
The main objectives of this reform are the reduction of duality and wage rigidity, and 
the promotion of internal flexibility within firms (Felipe Sáez 2011). The main fea-
tures of the reform are as follows. First, regarding hiring formulas: i) the promotion 
of indefinite hiring, by reducing compensation of objective dismissal (with the re-
definition of the economic causes); ii) the extension of the workers that can be hired 
through the so-called contracts of employment promotion – contratos de fomento 
(with greater ease and lower cost of dismissal, in justified cases); iii) the introduction 
of new limits on temporary hiring and on contracts’ duration for work and service, 
and; iv) extension of the groups of workers that can benefit from traineeships and 
apprenticeships. 
Second, in the lay-offs’ context working conditions were modified and a more 
flexible representation of workers was considered and the use of arbitration when 
there was disagreement. Third, with regard to the duration of collective labour con-
tracts, changing of the established conditions of higher order collective agreements is 
allowed when there is a private agreement between employer and employee. Fourth, 
regarding labour market policies, the possibility is introduced that the Public Em-
ployment Services may, in certain circumstances, make brokerage arrangements with 
private job placement agencies or other entities. Temporary employment agencies 
may also conduct placement activities in new sectors. Finally, in what relates to col-
lective bargaining, the law includes a commitment for reforming the collective bar-
gaining agreement with the social agents.  
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Although this reform has been in force for a short time, it seems that it is al-
ready failing to meet the desired objectives in terms of stimulating employment and 
reducing temporality, since the number of indefinite contracts remained virtually 
stagnant, the growth of negotiated wages barely moderated and the increase in em-
ployment as a result of new employment promotion contracts was not as significant 
as expected. The scarce results of this reform have led the government to adopt some 
additional measures relating to the promotion of part-time employment, the trans-
formation of temporary contracts into indefinite ones and the introduction of a new 
training and learning contract for young workers. 
In future it seems that this reform may lead to some changes. It is expected 
that the employment promotion contract will become more widely used than in the 
past primarily for two reasons. Firstly because compensation by objective dismissal 
is almost 30% lower than in conventional indefinite contracts and secondly because 
the cost of unfounded dismissal is considerably lower than in other types of con-
tracts. 
In terms of temporary hiring, due to the introduction of greater restrictions on 
temporary contracts and on work and service contracts, it is likely that new contracts 
will be replaced by informal relationships or forged part-time jobs, especially among 
low-skilled workers. Nevertheless, these types of contracts will continue to be largely 
used, as indefinite hiring is still unattractive to employers in certain circumstances. In 
what concerns promoting employment for specific groups of workers, the introduc-
tion or enhancement of direct and indirect incentives will favour the hiring of these 
collectives. 
This reform of the labour market can be considered as being relatively conser-
vative. Its main objective was the reduction of the gap between compensations for 
dismissal of indefinite and temporary contracts, by using some formulas that have 
been tested in previous reforms with little success (José Ignácio Conde-Ruiz, Floren-
tino Felgueroso, and José Ignácio García-Pérez 2011). This reform has shown that 
the government’s stance regarding the interests and proposals of entrepreneurs and 
trade unions is not optimal. Since it has failed to achieve the desired objectives, in 
the short term, measures should be taken in order to promote job creation and reduce 
the problems that still persist in this particular market. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
After four years of crisis, the Spanish economy is stagnant, with little prospects of 
recovery. Growth dynamics will be progressive as a result of the adjustments needed 
to correct the imbalances accumulated in the expansion period and the deterioration 
of the fiscal situation during the crisis. The economic activity’s recovery will con-
tinue to be very moderate, due to several factors, namely to the negative forecasts on 
the evolution of public consumption and of investment in housing in 2011 and 2012, 
as a consequence of the intense fiscal consolidation and the adjustment in the real 
estate market. Public demand will be reduced due to the need to balance public fi-
nances, by adapting to the available resources, while private demand will remain re-
stricted due to the high debt accumulated in recent years. 
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To overcome this situation it is necessary to break the vicious circle of low 
economic growth, high unemployment and elevated debt. It is essential to redefine 
the growth model by choosing labour intensive and credit extensive alternatives. In 
this sense it is necessary to adopt measures that may enhance the services sector and 
some tradable sectors. In this model, exports have an absolutely fundamental role. 
The lack of domestic demand might be offset by the dynamics of foreign demand if 
adequate measures are taken in order to restore the competitiveness lost in recent 
years. In the short term, a move that could boost competitiveness is the so-called 
competitive devaluation already implemented in other countries (Laborda 2010). 
This measure, which is equivalent to a monetary devaluation, consists in reducing the 
taxes paid by companies to Social Security, thereby lowering labour costs. The short-
fall in Social Security would be offset by increases in VAT or other indirect taxes. 
The subsequent gain in competitiveness would help to increase exports, thus 
recovering corporate earnings. This measure would also contribute to job creation 
(and unemployment reduction), thanks to its lower costs, which in turn would then 
contribute to the recovery of household incomes. Therefore, the increase of private 
sector income could speed up the deleveraging process and reduce the high volumes 
of private debt. In the medium term increases in competitiveness require more in-
vestment in education and R&D and higher levels of competition in some sectors 
which are relatively protected. 
The two key sectors in the detonation and extent of the crisis, real estate and 
banking, should stabilize. The economic recovery in the medium term is only possi-
ble if the process of correcting imbalances in these sectors is intensified. The banking 
sector has a key role in the stock elimination of unsold new homes. On the one hand, 
because, due the large number of properties that at this time it has in its portfolio, it 
should lead the process of price adjustment, which is still incomplete. On the other 
hand, because when the current credit rationing in the wholesale markets is reduced, 
it should relax the conditions for granting loans, even guaranteeing certain standards 
of creditworthiness. 
In the normalization of the real estate sector the government also has an im-
portant role. The measures implemented in the last year and a half intended to limit 
tax benefits to house purchasers are going in the right direction.
3 However, the rental 
market needs to be boosted by increasing the liberalization and simplification of con-
tracts, by improving legal security for the owners, by removing barriers to tenants, by 
introducing tax benefits to rental and by re-orientating public housing policies (José 
García-Montalvo 2009). 
The normalization of the banking sector will take some time. Despite the ex-
tensive reform carried out, there are reasonable doubts about whether the measures 
implemented will be sufficient to address the imbalances accumulated during the pre-
crisis period. Because of these doubts markets continue without fully relying on the 
health of the Spanish banking industry, due to its still high exposure to real estate and 
the large volume of potentially problematic assets. 
 
                                                        
3 For a discussion on this for the Spanish case see Miguel Ángel López García (2004).  
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For markets to regain confidence in the Spanish banking sector it is necessary 
to deepen the reforms already started, to consolidate the reorganization process, to 
accelerate the recognition of losses and to rapidly increase equity levels. Addition-
ally, it is absolutely necessary to improve transparency by regularly providing de-
tailed information to markets. In this sense, in such a heterogeneous sector, the most 
problematic situations should be isolated, to avoid that the entire sector is ultimately 
affected by uncertainty (Carbó Valverde and Maudos 2011). 
The banking sector reform was not the only one that did not produce the ex-
pected results. The results of the reform of the labour market were also well short of 
the expectations initially created (Conde-Ruiz, Felgueroso, and García-Pérez 2011). 
The changes did not lead to job creation or to the reduction of the large market seg-
mentation. The conservatism of the reform prevented it from achieving its major ob-
jectives and it proved once again that the labour market needs to be reformed without 
prejudice. 
To reduce the duality and diminish the prevailing high levels of temporality of 
the Spanish labour market it is necessary to introduce a single employment contract, 
as has been defended for several years by many Spanish academics (see, for instance, 
Samuel Bentolila, Juan José Dolado, and José Francisco Jimeno 2008) and various 
international organizations. This type of contract will promote the creation of stable 
jobs and the accumulation of human capital, and it will simultaneously ensure that 
wages are set in accordance to the evolution of productivity (Ángel Ubide 2011a). 
The recovery of the Spanish economy is also heavily constrained by the insta-
bility in the international markets since the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis. 
The Spanish public finances and therefore its creditworthiness are very different 
from the countries rescued so far (Greece, Ireland and Portugal). Its level of debt is 
significantly lower and the economic growth expected for the next few years is 
slightly higher (Emilio Ontiveros 2011a). In addition, there were no anomalies in 
their public accounts and the government has responded to all requests concerning 
information. 
Although since the first interventions, Greece and Ireland, the Spanish econ-
omy has decoupled itself from these countries, in terms of perception, from a given 
moment in time contagion became explicit, and the risk differential began to in-
crease, primarily for two reasons. The first one is the high private indebtedness of the 
Spanish economy. In the current situation, this problem is aggravated by the low ex-
pectations for economic growth and the high unemployment levels. The probability 
that this situation can trigger the conversion of private debt into public debt is re-
flected in higher risk premium for sovereign debt (Ontiveros 2011b). 
The second reason is the governance deficit in the eurozone (Jean Pisani-Ferry 
2010). In Europe most of the errors committed during the management of the emerg-
ing markets’ crisis of the nineties were repeated. Decision-making has been ex-
tremely slow, concern over moral hazard excessive and rescue measures in some 
cases absolutely insufficient (Ubide 2011b). 
Currently, there are two major lines of intervention over which should lay the 
foundations of the Spanish economic recovery. First, at the national level, the re-
forms implemented over the past two years should be further pursued and structural  
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reforms in other areas should be initiated (Javier Suárez 2010). Additionally, the 
process of bank restructuring should be completed and the model of state organiza-
tion should be redesigned (Jesús Fernández Villaverde and Lee Ohanian 2010). Sec-
ondly, at the European level, solutions should be promoted to eliminate the funda-
mental problems of the eurozone: the restrictions on the European Central Bank’s 
intervention (De Grauwe 2011b) and the lack of fiscal integration (De Grauwe 2010). 
Since the likely solutions may involve changing the Union’s Treaty, support shall be 
provided for temporary solutions that restore confidence in the markets and allow the 
recovery of financing levels. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The problems being faced by the Spanish economy are not the usual of a cyclical 
downturn (Kosta Josifidis, Alpar Lošonc, and Novica Supić 2010). Their severity can 
make it move further away, convergence wise, from developed countries, particularly 
from EU countries, which are also having difficulties to keep up with the growth of 
the emerging areas and to meet the challenges of globalization. 
The impact of the financial crisis on the real economy caused a sharp drop in 
output and an enormous rise in unemployment. The burst of the real estate bubble 
produced a very strong shock on economic activity and employment. The high expo-
sure of banking to construction and real estate activities (through the massive vol-
umes of credit granted) was the means of transmission of the housing crisis into the 
banking industry. The consequence of this contagion is that the Spanish banks have 
faced serious solvency problems, especially from 2009. 
Currently, the recovery of economic growth is strongly affected by the high 
level of debt, especially private debt, and the high unemployment rate. Additionally, 
the serious financial situation of the private sector together with the financing diffi-
culties in the international markets, adversely affect the banking system, which have 
serious problems to finance the economy. 
Besides a broad program of fiscal consolidation, which began in 2010, the au-
thorities have promoted various economic reforms in some sectors and markets, but 
results have fallen far short of expectations. A well succeed exit strategy for the cur-
rent situation needs, on the one hand, to deepen the reforms launched so far and, on 
the other, to extend the reformist agenda to other areas, such as education and re-
search, as a way of guaranteeing further increases in growth potential. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
327  Causes and Consequences of the Spanish Economic Crisis: Why the Recovery is Taken so Long? 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 3, pp. 309-328
References  
 
Álvarez Aledo, Carlos. 2011. “Mercado de Trabajo: Balance global.” Economistas, 126: 97-
109. 
Banco de España. 2010. Informe de Estabilidad Financiera 10/2010. Madrid: Banco de 
España. 
Banco de España. 2011a. Informe Anual. Madrid: Banco de España. 
Banco de España. 2011b. Informe de Estabilidad Financiera 05/2011. Madrid: Banco de 
España. 
Banco de España. 2011c. Cuentas Financieras de la Economía Española. Madrid: Banco de 
España. 
Banco de España. 2011d. Evolución y Reforma de las Cajas de Ahorros. Madrid: Banco de 
España. 
Bentolila, Samuel, Juan José Dolado, and José Francisco Jimeno. 2008. “Two-Tier 
Employment Protection Reforms: The Spanish Experience.” CESifo Database for 
International Comparisons in Europe (DICE) Report 4/2008. 
Berges, Ángel, and Emilio Ontiveros. 2011. “La Reestructuración del Sistema Bancario: 
Especial Consideración a las Cajas de Ahorro.” Economistas, 126: 97-109. 
Bilbao Terol, Celia, María A. García Valiñas, and Javier Suárez Pendiello. 2006. 
“Intervenciones Públicas, Haciendas Territoriales y Precios de la Vivienda.” Papeles 
de Economía Española, 109: 237-255. 
Carbó Valverde, Santiago, and Joaquín Maudos. 2011. “Reflexiones en torno a la 
Reestructuración del Sistema Bancario Español.” Cuadernos de Información 
Económica, 221: 81-95. 
Centro del Sector Financiero PwC and IE Business School. 2011. Interrelación entre la 
Financiación de la Banca Española y el Riesgo Soberano. Madrid: Centro del Sector 
Financiero PwC and IE Business School. 
Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio, Florentino Felgueroso, and José Ignacio García-Pérez. 2011. 
“Reforma Laboral 2010: Una Primera Evaluación y Propuestas de Mejora.” FEDEA 
Colección de Estudios Económicos 01-2011. 
Confederación de Cajas de Ahorro. 2011. Memoria 2010. Madrid: Confederación de Cajas 
de Ahorro. 
De Grauwe, Paul. 2010. “Crisis in the Eurozone and How to Deal With It.” The Centre for 
Economic Policy Studies Policy Brief, 204 (February): 1-6. 
De Grauwe, Paul. 2011a. “Governance of a Fragile Eurozone.” The Centre for Economic 
Policy Studies Working Document 346. 
De Grauwe, Paul. 2011b. “Only a More Active ECB Can Solve the Euro Crisis.” The Centre 
for Economic Policy Studies Policy Brief, 250 (August): 1-8. 
Fernández Villaverde, Jesús, and Lee Ohanian. 2010. “The Spanish Crisis from a Global 
Perspective.” Fundación de Economía Aplicada Working Paper 2010-03. 
García-Montalvo, José. 2009. “Financiación Inmobiliaria, Burbuja Crediticia y Crisis 
Financiera: Lecciones a partir de la Recesión de 2008-09.” Papeles de Economía 
Española, 122: 66-87.  
328  Francisco Carballo-Cruz 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 3, pp. 309-328 
Gurdgiev, Constantin, Brian M. Lucey, Ciarán Mac an Bhaird, and Lorcan Roche-
Kelly. 2011. “The Irish Economy: Three Strikes and You’re Out?” Panoeconomicus, 
58: 19-41. 
Josifidis, Kosta, Alpar Lošonc, and Novica Supić. 2010. “Neoliberalism: Befall or 
Respite?” Panoeconomicus, 57: 101-117. 
Kouretas, Georgios P., and Prodromos Vlamis. 2010. “The Greek Crisis: Causes and 
Implications.” Panoeconomicus, 57: 391-404. 
Krugman, Paul. 2009. “The Pain in Spain …” The New York Times. January 19, 2009. 
Krugman, Paul. 2010. “Anatomy of a Euromess …” The New York Times. February 9, 2010. 
Laborda, Ángel. 2010. “La Economía Española en la Encrucijada: Diagnóstico y Estrategias 
de Salida.” Cuadernos de Información Económica, 214: 65-72. 
López García, Miguel Ángel. 2004. “Housing, Prices and Tax Policy in Spain.” Spanish 
Economic Review, 6: 29–52. 
Loungani, Prakash. 2008. House Prices: Corrections and Consequences. Washington: 
World Economic Forum IMF. 
Martínez, David, Tomás Riestra, and Ignacio San Martín. 2006. “La Demanda de 
Vivienda, Factores Demográficos.” Papeles de Economía Española, 109: 91-105. 
Maudos, Joaquín. 2011. “El Impacto de la Crisis en los Bancos Españoles: 2007-2010.” 
Cuadernos de Información Económica, 222: 87-99. 
Ontiveros, Emilio. 2011a. “Precariedad en la Eurozona.” El País. April 19, 2011. 
Ontiveros, Emilio. 2011b. “Podemos Pagar?” El País. June 5, 2011. 
Pisani-Ferry, Jean. 2010. “Euro Area Governance: What Went Wrong in the Euro Area? 
How to Repair It?” Bruegel Policy Contribution, 05(June): 1-9. 
Rodríguez, Julio. 2011. “El Mercado y la Política de Vivienda.” Economistas, 126: 97-109. 
Sáez, Felipe. 2011. “Reflexiones en torno a la Reciente Reforma Laboral.” Economistas, 126: 
97-109. 
Serrano Martínez, José María. 2010. “La Edificación de Viviendas en España, Final del 
Ciclo y Ocaso del Modelo?” Boletín Económico del ICE, 2981: 37-55. 
Sgherri, Silvia, and Edda Zoli. 2009. “Euro Area Sovereign Risk During the Crisis.” The 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper 09/222. 
Sousa Andrade, João, and Adelaide Duarte. 2011. “The Fundamentals of the Portuguese 
Crisis.” Panoeconomicus, 58: 195-218. 
Suárez, Javier. 2010. “The Spanish Crisis: Background and Policy Changes.” Centre for 
Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 7909. 
Tamames, Ramón. 2009. Para Salir de la Crisis Global. Análisis y Soluciones. Propuestas 
para España y Latinoamérica. Madrid: Ediciones Algaba. 
Tinsa. 2011. Índice de Mercados Inmobiliarios Españoles – Julio 2011. Madrid: Tinsa. 
Ubide, Ángel. 2011a. “La Teoría Económica del 15-M.” El País. June 5, 2011. 
Ubide, Ángel. 2011b. “La Fragilidad de la Política Económica.” El País. June 26, 2011. 
 